Everything you need to know about stunning, culling and slaughter techniques for farm animals

During the FLI Animal Welfare and Disease Control Seminar, organized at September 23, 2015 in Celle, Germany, a group of experts will give their vision on how the possible contribution of each transmission route could be determined and how a revolutionary new response strategy could be developed, based on the principle of neutralizing transmission routes.

There are several factors, which contribute to the unique presentation of an avian influenza outbreak, like the relationship of this virus with wild waterfowl. The virus is highly pathogenic for chickens and turkeys but not pathogenic for waterfowl.
Since the virus in our current outbreak is not pathogenic for waterfowl, the vast flocks of healthy virus-infected migratory geese and ducks travel thousands of miles, entering into commercial poultry-producing regions while shedding tremendous quantities of infectious avian influenza virus in their feces.
You are more than welcome to participate in this English-spoken event. You can sign up by replying your name, including the name of your institute/company, to angelika.gaupp@fli.bund.de, or by fax: +49/5141-3846-117.

We wanted this seminar to be accessible for all, and for that reason, the participation fee is € 70 only. Unfortunately, the number of participants is limited, so in case you’re interested, please let us know and respond before August 31, 2015. After you signed up, you will receive your detailed payment instructions.

This international – English-language based – seminar is open for animal welfare specialists, veterinary specialists, and emergency response experts. The event takes place on the premises of FLI; starts at 9 AM; and closes at 4 PM, after the general discussion.

In case you need more information or any assistance, please contact me on: 0046 761 731 779 or by mail on harm.kie@gmail.com.

You are very welcome to pass this invitation to all of your colleagues, who may also be interested in the seminar.

I am looking forward to see you there.

Kind regards,
Harm Kiezebrink

Associate Research Fellow FLI

Federal Research Institute for Animal Health
Friedrich Loeffler Institute
Dörnbergstr. 25/27 | 29223 Celle
Tel: +49 5141 3846 130 | Fax: +49 5141 3846 117
http://www.fli.bund.de/

HYDERABAD: It was only after 39,240 birds perished that the state animal husbandry department woke up to the deadly avian influenza virus doing the rounds on the city outskirts. The deaths of layer birds (used for egg production) took place in two poultry farms in Thorrur village of Hayatnagar mandal a full one week before the government declared the bird flu outbreak.

The owners of the two poultry farms, V Bala Krishna Reddy and Srinivas Reddy, had reported the deaths of the birds from April 6-April 13 to the Bhopal-based High Security Animal Diseases Laboratory (HSADL). The lab, in turn, informed the central government following the samples of the dead birds sent to them by the Reddy brothers turning positive for the H5N1 virus.

The state animal husbandry department, which was in the dark of the developments all this while, was finally informed about the outbreak by the central government’s department of animal husbandry, dairy development and fisheries.

The break-up of poultry deaths that fell prey to the avian influenza include 80 (April 6), 160 (April 7), 400 (April 8), 1,600 (April 9), 2,500 (April 10), 17,500 (April 11), 9,000 (April 12) and 7,500 deaths (April 13) respectively, as per records in possession with TOI.

“This is a glaring example of how the government officials had utterly failed in reporting the disease, which is mandatory for all notified diseases including H5N1, as required under The Prevention and Control of Infectious and Contagious Diseases in Animals Act, 2009. The stakeholders must be held accountable now as the damage has already been done,” said city-based wildlife expert Dr C Srinivasulu.

In fact, the Section 4 of the Act states that it is obligatory for the owner or any person in charge of any animal which he has reason to believe to be infective of a scheduled disease, to report the fact to village panchayat or villager officer, who in turn has to report it to the nearest government veterinarian.

However, it is learnt that nothing of this sort happened with top officials of the directorate of animal husbandry, Telangana, admitting that neither their veterinary assistant surgeon Anand Reddy nor two village livestock officers (VLOs) of Hayatnagar mandal in Ranga Reddy had any inkling of the outbreak in their local jurisdiction.

Interestingly, Dr Y Thirupathaiah, additional director, directorate of animal husbandry, Telangana gave a clean chit to their officials. “Our people cannot be blamed as the burden of sharing information about the outbreak of infective diseases vests with the village officer and the panchayat. We will be writing to the Ranga Reddy collectorate for action against the erring officials,” he said, acknowledging that they learnt about the outbreak from central government sources on April 13.

In the U.S. new strains of avian flu that are highly infectious among birds have been found on commercial turkey farms in many states, as The Wall Street Journal has reported. An initial outbreak of H5N8 detected in a Californian turkey flock in January has mixed with North American avian flu strains to generate two new strains, including H5N2, which has been detected along the Pacific bird migration route in Washington, Idaho, and Oregon.

In addition, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has announced that H5N2 had been detected in Minnesota, the first instance of the disease in the Mississippi bird migration route. The virus has spread further to commercial turkey farms in Missouri and Arkansas, including to suppliers of Butterball turkeys.

In an editorial, published online at chick-site.com – March 25, 2015, Dr. Simon M. Shane questions the role of field researchers in transmitting infections from wildlife reservoirs to commercial farms. A March 13th article published by Reuters authored by Tom Polansek highlights questions by wildlife biologists as to the status of migratory waterfowl as reservoirs of H5N2 Avian Influenza which has been isolated from turkey farms in Minnesota, Missouri and Arkansas.

It is an irrefutable fact that identical strains of the pathogen have been isolated from affected turkey farms and from waterfowl. The weight of molecular evidence extending back to 2012 indicates the role of migratory birds in the process of genetic reassortment and dissemination from Asia along the Pacific Flyway.

Dr. Brian McCluskey, Lead Epidemiologist for the USDA-Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service stated “we are pointing right now to ducks as the problem.” Exhaustive assays using advanced analytical techniques including gene sequencing have indicated that the H5N2 virus is carried by waterfowl along the Mississippi Flyway and now more recently the Central Flyway, northward from the Gulf of Mexico.

Dr. Hon Ip a Microbiologist for the National Wildlife Health Center questions the conclusions of the epidemiologists stating “when you are talking about where I would put my money I would say that North to South movement (of infection-Ed.) in the beginning of March totally does not make sense.” The fact that the sequence of infections as confirmed was from North to South, ie. the first case from Minnesota (March 4th) then Missouri (March 9th and 10th) followed by Arkansas (March 11th) all within a short period does not preclude that birds migrating Northwards are transmitting the disease.

Epidemiologic investigations take into account both spatial (location) and temporal (time sequence) factors. It is possible that different groups of ducks, whether by species or age cohort are transmitting virus intra-flock or excreting virus at different rates. Given the small number of outbreaks reported, it is not possible to draw any conclusions such as those expressed by Dr. Ip.

Lou Comicelli, Wildlife Research Manager for the Minnesota Division of Fish and Wildlife stated “it is extraordinary unlikely that avian influenza in a turkey flock in Minnesota has anything to do with wild birds.” This statement is totally unsubstantiated and in fact is contradicted by established scientific investigations. These involved studies on the patterns of seroconversion following infection of range-housed turkeys and sentinels in Minnesota. Strains of avian influenza of low pathogenicity were common to turkeys and waterfowl and antibodies in turkeys were detected concurrently with the appearance of migratory species.

Apparently after the diagnosis of AI in Minnesota turkey flocks was confirmed on March 4th, wildlife officials scouted a 15 mile radius around the farm using an aircraft. Apparently they observed 100 ducks and 18 swans that they concluded were non-migratory “resident birds”. Wildlife biologists in Arkansas also doubt the role of migratory birds because the area where the first case was detected in the state “does not attract many wild birds and waterfowl.”

It is incontrovertible that migratory waterfowl are the reservoirs of H5N2 in the current series of outbreaks involving backyard farms and the few commercial turkey units where the disease has been diagnosed. Obviously defects in biosecurity have allowed the virus to be introduced on to those farms. Possible routes include supplying contaminated, non-chlorinated water from open sources to poultry flocks or failure to implement appropriate personal biosecurity. In this respect workers or contractors hunting or those coming in contact with fecal material voided by waterfowl could have been responsible.

Naturally wildlife biologists are in a state of denial since they are directly and indirectly funded by hunting even though they claim that they are conservationists. Any factor which interferes with their status quo represents a risk to their “field research” and wildlife “management”.

We are now in a new era of avian influenza. No longer is our risk represented by a worker traveling North from Mexico or Guatemala. The paradigm shift requires an understanding of the factors associated with infection and persistence of shedding in migratory waterfowl and the factors linking these reservoir populations with commercial poultry. Cooperation and mutual understanding between wildlife biologist and avian epidemiologists will be necessary to establish appropriate policies relating to commercial poultry production and the recreational exploitation of waterfowl. Denial of scientific fact and an inability to comprehend basic epidemiologic principles coupled with disharmony will detract from productive solutions.

A team of virologists, epidemiologists and microbiologists in China has published a study warning that the deadly H7N9 bird flu virus can pass from human to human.

The paper, published in the British Medical Journal, is a case study investigating the apparent transmission of the disease from a father to his daughter, both of whom have since died. It is the first case study of its kind.

“There is great cause for concern in that this is such a lethal form of influenza, we’ve hardly seen anything more lethal”

Peter Openshaw Director of the Centre for Respiratory Infection at Imperial College London, Director of the Centre for Respiratory Infection at Imperial College London.

Although the news will be met with concern in China, where 132 cases have been recorded on the mainland since its outbreak in March across 40 cities, resulting in 43 deaths, it is an incredibly rare instance. It has aways been suspected that other bird influenzas have been passed from human to human on rare occassions. However, as with this rare recorded and researched case, those instances tended to be among genetically related family members, suggesting that those involved have pre-disposed vulnerabilities.

The World Health Organisation issued warnings early this year to the effect that H7N9 is one of the most lethal forms of the bird flu virus, as it appeared to be transmitted far more easily than even the deadly H5N1 virus. “So far it’s been very reassuring not to have signs of human to human transmission, and this is the first well documented case. But we need to appreciate this was a transmission to a blood relative within a family.”

The first cases of H7N9 were reported in early March. Advanced cases present with symptoms including severe pneumonia and acute respiratory distress syndrome. It was not until the end of April, more than a month after the outbreak, and 23 deaths later, that the apparent cause of the disease was detected. It had been traced back to live poultry farms in the east, in particular hubs at Zhejiang along the coast.

The H7 was thought to have derived from domestic ducks in the province, and the N5 from wild birds in South Korea. It was after visiting a live poultry farm that the first patient in the new study fell ill in March this year. He had visited the markets regularly, and had also bought six quails that had already been slaughtered by a vendor a week before falling ill. By contrast, the 60-year-old’s daughter had not — as far as anyone involved in the study knows — had any contact with live poultry, aside from two black swans owned by an employee of her property’s management team. Those swans were swabbed, however, and no sign of the virus showed up in samples.

The daughter cared for her father on and off throughout his illness, which was initially not diagnosed as bird flu. In the early stages of his illness she cared for him at home, but also routinely visited him in hospital once admitted. The father, who had a history of hypertension, fell ill on 8 March and deteriortated rapidly from the 18 March. It was on 21 March that the daughter, who had no underlying health issues, fell ill. Multiple courses of antibiotics did not thwart the disease, and she died of multi-organ failure and cardiac arrest on 24 April 2013.

Although the study’s authors admit there’s no way of knowing whether the daughter did in fact have some other contact with poultry (both patients had died by the time the investigation began), they believe the genetic evidence is enough to confirm the transmission from father to daughter.

“Sequence analysis showed that both possessed high degrees of similarity between nucleotide (99.6 percent to 99.9 percent) and amino acid (99.0 percent and 100 percent) sequences,” write the authors. The only other person to provide beside care for the father was his son-in-law (who did not fall ill), along with the doctors and nurses that would have attended to him — further circumstantial evidence suggesting it’s the genetics that’s the key to the human to human transmission. In total 39 hospital workers came into contact with the pair, and none fell ill.

“We know that there are genetic factors that contribute to human to human transmission,” according to Openshaw. “Some people are much more susceptible to flu than others, and that’s the reason it’s such a devastating disease. It’s shared genetic factors that makes people vulnerable.”

Going forward, Openshaw says the public has to realise that although cases of human to human transmission are rare, we should be abiding by standard safety measures stringently, as though infection were a real possibility.

“In hospital when you know someone has it, all precautions are taken in order to protect staff, but actually it’s very rare among most strains for transmission to happen. It’s the reason Sars became so deadly — it transmitted very well to healthcare staff, and other patients.” Openshaw recommends never dropping any kind of safety measures. For instance, some healthcare workers will just wear a mask, and not gloves, or scrubs but not a mask. “Relatives will be caring for their sick and elderly and although absolute protection is very hard to guarantee, we should never drop any measures.”

Openshaw did commend China for managing to curb the spread of the disease quite effectively, after closing a series of poultry markets.

“The Chinese are really good at doing things properly in a way that’s hard to achieve in perhaps more liberal countries, and that should be admired. Whether it comes back again when the season returns is the question. People are holding their breath to see if it truly went away or it’s just a pause, because we know a lot of flu is quite seasonal.”

When it comes to protecting future generations from human to human transmission, Openshaw says we need to be doing more to identify the underlying genetic causes that make some people more vulnerable to infection than others.

“We need to show how much variations in the virus contribute, and how much variations in the human host contribute.” Openshaw is currently working with 45 research groups based in the UK and abroad to find the answer. Eight thousand samples have been gathered from patients hospitalised due to severe flu in London and Liverpool, and the team has just begun to trawl through that data to look for recurring patterns.

A past study published in Nature, of which Openshaw was an author, found that those with the gene IFITM3 and the protein used to encode it, were more likely to be hospitalised because of flu.

“It’s a major risk factor in our hospital study, and that finding has been replicated in Southeast Asia where it’s quite normal to see big variations in IFITM3 — among Han Chinese it’s about 25 percent, and among Japanese there is a variation of up to 40 percent.”

Openshaw says he and his team have a list of around 20 genes that appear to be associated with flu vulnerability, and he hopes to have the opportunity to further investigate samples from the father and daughter, who were not tested for IFITM3.

Taipei, Jan. 24 (CNA) The new H5N2 and H5N8 avian influenza virus strains recently detected on poultry farms in Taiwan are not transmissible to humans, Taiwan’s Centers for Disease Control (CDC) said Saturday.

An analysis of the genome sequence of the viruses indicates that they are of avian origin and entered Taiwan recently, according to CDC deputy chief Chuang Jen-hsiang (莊人祥). The H5N2 and H5N8 strains did not mutate from viruses found previously in Taiwan, he said.

The H5N8 virus isolated in Taiwan is highly homologous with the strains found in South Korea, Japan, the United States, Canada and Germany and it shows weak ability to replicate in mammals, Chuang said.

Compared with the H7N9 virus that can infect humans, the H5N8 virus is significantly less risky, he said.

He stressed the new H5N2 and H5N8 outbreaks in Taiwan are limited to poultry and that there have been no reports of human infection. The CDC will continue to monitor the outbreaks and check for any mutations of the viruses, he added.